Moonwell’s post-mortem on the August 27 MAMO incident on Base adds an important detail to the initial $8.7 million exploit story. The attacker did not simply bypass a supply cap with a larger deposit. Moonwell says the operation combined collateral-accounting inflation with manipulation of MAMO’s oracle price. The key step was a direct transfer of more than 53 million MAMO into the mMAMO market without minting new shares. That increased the value represented by existing shares by about 3.68x. The attacker then used the inflated collateral position to borrow liquid assets, including cbBTC and USDC.

This matters because a supply cap can protect one entry path while leaving another accounting path exposed. In other words, a limit on deposits is not automatically a limit on economic exposure. Moonwell cut Base Core Market borrow caps to 1 wei during the incident.

The full Moonwell post-mortem includes the transaction timeline and contract-level evidence.

The lesson is narrow but important: lending protocols need to test every way collateral can change value, not only the normal deposit function.